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migrations—a theme that has been debated for more than a century and continues
to be of major political relevance in Igboland today. In Nigerian political dis-
course, the precolonial ‘statelessness’ of Igbo society (that is, its lack of large-scale
structures of political organization beyond the level of the village group) is often
perceived as a deficit, placing the Igbo at a disadvantage, in terms of prestige,
against other major ethnic groups. As a solid historian, Afigbo continues to
reject popular views that identify—or rather invent—statehood and kingship in
precolonial Igbo society. Instead, he presents a model of the migratory history of
south-eastern Nigeria where the Igbo form of socio-political organization (charac-
terized by small-scale organization with a very limited degree of social and political
stratification, and organized around kinship and religious ritual) appears as the
‘original’ form—that is, the one that existed throughout southern Nigeria before
secondary migrations from the Niger-Benue confluence area introduced state or
state-like structures on a larger scale (i.e. the Yoruba states, the Benin kingdom
and the Nri centre of religious influence) at some time in the second half of the
first millennium CE. Afigbo even claims that southern Nigeria as a whole was orig-
inally settled by ‘Mega-Igbo’/‘greater Igbo’ (his terminology varies in different
essays) who spoke a proto-Kwa language; and that out of this larger group, only
the ‘Micro-Igbo’/‘lesser Igbo’ (i.e. the Igbo as known today) kept their original
structures of socio-political organization in the longer run (‘The Idea of Igbo
History’, published in 2000, MHS Chapter 1; ‘Igbo Genesis’, written in 2000,
IHS Chapter 6; ‘Igbo Enwe Eze: Beyond Onwumechili and Onwuejeogwu’,
published in 2002, IHS Chapter 28). It remains to be seen whether Afigbo will be
able to develop this innovative idea beyond the conceptual level into a full-scale
new theory about the history of migrations and the emergence of statehood in
southern Nigeria.
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The fall of the Third French Republic in 1940 and the establishment of the
authoritarian, right-wing government of Marshall Pe´tain in unoccupied Vichy
France left one of France’s largest colonies, the federation of French West Africa
(AOF), with a choice. The colonial administration in the AOF declared their
loyalty to Pe´tain and for 3 years, from 1940 to 1943, AOF would be one of the
few places where the new, patriotic-conservative Vichy ideology and the colonial
reality collided. Only in 1943 did the Governor-General of the federation switch
his allegiance to the allied side, a pragmatic change reflecting the dominance of
US forces in North Africa.
In 1996, Catherine Akpo-Vache´ published a study of AOF during the Second
World War. That text describes the structures of Vichy rule in detail, though the
author is primarily interested in the resistance and victory of the Gaullist side.
Nevertheless, given that Akpo-Vache´’s account of the Vichy government in AOF is
comprehensive (if descriptive), one has to ask if there is a need for another broad
analysis. Ruth Ginio justifies covering this topic again by making three innovative
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claims. First, she believes that under Vichy rule French administrators in West
Africa dropped their mask because they were able to behave as they had always
really wanted. Given the changed situation, they promptly started to treat Africans
as ‘primitives’, without any reference to the ‘myths’ of assimilation or theoretical
egalitarianism that had previously been central to French colonial policy. Second,
Ginio considers the activity of the Vichy-led administration in AOF as part of
a broader imperial project. The Vichy ideology had no lasting effects, but only
because of the short-lived nature of the regime. Finally, Ginio argues that African
anger about the Vichy experience motivated the elite to sever its emotional ties to
the French state, and from 1943 onwards to seek independence. The abuses of
the Vichy period were a trigger that permitted the African elite to attack colonial-
ism, and they are seen by Ginio as providing a ‘framework’ for subsequent change.
Ginio’s conclusions are striking, but are they correct? The author glances at the
careers of French administrators under Vichy rule, and admits that there are com-
plicated cases, but she does not really capture the ambivalence of the position of
an administrator in the late colonial state. A deeper look at some individual
careers of administrators would have given her much rich material on which to
speculate. Christian Lambert, administrator in Touba in Ivory Coast, is a typical
case for example. Lambert was obviously a supporter of the Le´gion, the popular
movement founded to celebrate ‘Pe´tainist’ virtues. Nevertheless, he later fled to
British territory to join the ranks of the ‘Free French’ and became the director of
the cabinet office for Andre´ Latrille in the Ivory Coast. Latrille was the most
liberal of the governors in the aftermath of Second World War and Lambert
eagerly helped him to introduce reforms. Shortly afterwards, Lambert was targeted
by supporters of the Re´sistance in the AOF and was dismissed for his earlier
Pe´tainist behaviour despite his subsequent liberal activity. This type of career was
common. French administrators had to live with competing loyalties and this
made for lives full of ambiguity. They could be socialists, reformers, conservatives,
paternalists and Vichy supporters within a short space of time. They could
support ‘tradition’ and the ‘mission to civilize’ in one breath. This is even true for
the ‘villain’ of the story of Vichy AOF, Governor-General Pierre Boisson, who
betrayed his former commitment to the anti-German struggle by deciding to
support the Vichy regime. As Jean Koufan has shown, Boisson had been an agent
of the Popular Front seeking to implement socialist reforms in Cameroun in the
late 1930s, so he too was a more ambiguous figure than some accounts suggest. It
is difficult to claim that the administrators in the AOF dropped their masks to
reveal their underlying ideology when they supported Vichy, because their atti-
tudes and histories were more complex than such a narrative suggests. This brings
me to Ginio’s second key point: it is hard to see a coherent, empire-wide pro-
gramme behind something which was as make-shift and improvised as the admin-
istration in the AOF between 1940 and 1943. Finally, it is questionable to say that
the Vichy experience in itself was a major stimulus for decolonization. By the
second half of the 1940s, the abuses of the Vichy period had ceased to be a recur-
rent subject in the political rhetoric of African elites. On the contrary, they were
enthusiastic about the new rights and privileges they obtained in the aftermath of
the war: liberation appeared to happen in the colonies just as it appeared to
happen in the metropolis. It was only when the process of introducing those rights
was slowed down by opposition from settlers and by the ambiguities of colonial
structures that voices for emancipation became louder. Even then they did not
refer to the Vichy experience of the ‘wrong France’, but to the unfulfilled promises
of the ‘Free French’.
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Though Ginio’s conclusions can be questioned, her book remains valuable. It
significantly extends our knowledge about the Vichy period in AOF. Some parts,
particularly the discussion of the ways in which colonial subjects, including mar-
abouts and chiefs, utilized the new situation for their own ends are particularly
useful. However, the book overstates the role of the Vichy period in France’s
African experience—change in the relations between Africans and French coloni-
sers was not a product of AOF’s three-year Vichy period.
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Recently, there has been a string of publications seeking to explain the cause of
the 11-year-long bloody civil war in Sierra Leone. A number of the authors and
contributors are Sierra Leoneans who, as insiders, bring ‘a nationalist perspective’.
While this constitutes an invaluable contribution to the debate of state, conflict
and conflict resolution, it can (in some cases) produce a problem of ‘mechanistic
praxis’: we were there, so we (alone) have the knowledge to chronicle the course of
events. Methodologically, this approach fails to accede to the caveat of Robert
Merton about the potential subjectivity of insiders, while not underestimating the
strength insiders could bring to the field of research.
Gberie has managed to transcend this pitfall, while at the same time producing
a text, which has brought new insight into the deceit and machinations of
the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) leadership and the hopeless attempts of
a failed state to confront a small, but determined group of fighters. The latter’s
defeat was only possible with external intervention: initially from mercenary
outfits, such as Ghurkha Security, Executive Outcomes and later from regional
peace-keeping forces, such as the Nigerian-led ECOMOG, and friendly govern-
ments, such as the intervention by the British Government.
Gberie’s book is premised on two fallacies: the first is common in nationalist
circles, namely that the RUF destroyed Sierra Leone through its long campaign
against successive civilian and military regimes in that unfortunate country. The
truth is that by the time war broke out in March 1991, Sierra Leone was an
infrastructural wreck, thanks to 23 years of misrule by the All Peoples Congress
peppered by a series of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) sponsored by
international financial institutions, which pauperized the vast majority of the
populace. By the time rebel leader Foday Sankoh and his rag–tag army started
their pogrom against the people of Sierra Leone, the Bonapartist Siaka Stevens
and his phlegmatic successor, Brigadier Joseph Saidu Momoh had managed to
transform a country with tremendous developmental potential into the laughing-
stock of the world. They had obliterated any semblance of democracy in favour of
kleptocracy through the dictatorship of Congress. The second fallacy is Gberie’s
‘double talk’ on the aetiology of the war. On the one hand he spends a consider-
able time berating ‘the scrofulous APC one-party state. . .’ (p. 11), and on the
other hand he argues that it is not possible to locate the motivation behind the
RUF war. In his view, the RUF was a mercenary outfit whose raison d’eˆtre was to
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